ABSTRACT: This paper defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I argue for the skeptical view that putative reasons of the wrong kind are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes but not reasons for those attitudes. The argument turns on the transmission of reasons: the familiar fact that there is often reason for one action or attitude because there is reason for another. I argue that putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit in a different way to the right kind of reasons, and that this fact is best explained by the skeptical view.
Introduction
Fitting-attitudes accounts of value (FA accounts) hold, to a first approximation, that the valuable is what there is sufficient reason to value. Accounts of this form look especially plausible when applied to certain specific value properties. For example, each of the following analyses looks highly compelling: For x to be admirable is for there to be sufficient reason to admire x. For x to be enviable is for there to be sufficient reason to envy x. For x to be amusing is for there to be sufficient reason to be amused by x.
These analyses are plausible because the admirable, the enviable, and the amusing are each conceptually connected to an attitude or reaction of a certain sort. But the connection is not a 6
[i]t is difficult to find an independent rationale for distinguishing in the relevant way between reasons for an attitude and reasons to bring it about that we have that attitude…in the demon scenario, the intuition that we do have reasons to favour the demon seems at least as strong as any contrary intuition. 7 It is perhaps unfair to say that WKR skeptics have offered no argument for their claim.
Several authors argue for WKR skepticism by appealing to one of the marks of the wrong kind of reason noted above -that we seem not to be able to respond to the wrong kind of reasons by forming the relevant attitude. These authors argue that we cannot respond to such reasons in this way, and that if we cannot respond to some consideration by forming an attitude, then that consideration is not a reason for that attitude. However, while this argument has significant appeal, it is it is difficult to get the details straight -to specify a notion of 'responding to a reason' that will vindicate its two premises. 8 So it is worth considering whether WKR skepticism might be defended on other grounds. reasons of the wrong kind to explain the way in which such reasons behave. The central argument of this paper is that WKR skeptics succeed in meeting this challenge, and WKR defenders fail. In section three, I argue that WKR skeptics can explain why putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit in the way that they do, by appealing to the ways in which reasons to want and bring about attitudes transmit. In section four, I consider two strategies by which WKR defenders might try to explain the way in which reasons of the wrong kind transmit. I
argue that both these strategies fail, unless they are supplemented with a further thesis. But this further thesis, I argue, is false. WKR defenders are thus left without a way to explain the transmission of the wrong kind of reasons. I conclude that the difference in the ways in which reasons of the right and wrong kind transmit provides important support for WKR skepticism.
Transmission Patterns
It will be helpful to begin by looking in some detail at the way in which reasons for action transmit from ends to means.
Suppose that there are reasons for you to visit some friends in another part of the world -for example, in California. Because of this, there are reasons for you to take means to going to California -to book a ticket, travel to the airport, board the plane, and so forth.
There are also reasons for you to ensure that certain enabling conditions of your going to California are fulfilled -you might need to organize time off work, or renew your passport.
In other cases, there are reasons to take so called 'constitutive means' -reasons to swim as a way of exercising, or to go to the concert as a way of having a pleasant evening. Following Joseph Raz, I will say that any action that helps you to achieve an end (in one of these ways, or perhaps others) facilitates that end. 9 The examples suggest that we can say that reasons for action transmit in the following way:
(Action Pattern) If there is a reason to A, then the fact that B-ing facilitates A-ing is a reason to B.
Several points of clarification and qualification are in order.
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First, the Action Pattern says not merely that there is a reason to B, when B-ing facilitates A-ing; it says that the fact that B-ing facilitates A-ing is a reason to B. This gives us a weak sense in which there is a reason to B because there is a reason to A. Specifying the reason in this way will also make it easier to assess some of the claims about reasons made below.
Second, some may think that the fact that B-ing facilitates A-ing cannot itself be a reason to B, even when there is reason to A. Rather, the reasons to B, fully spelled out, will be the facts that constitute reasons to A, in conjunction with the fact that B-ing facilitates Aing. Readers of this view will prefer to formulate the Action Pattern as follows: if R is a reason to A, then the fact that R and that B-ing facilitates A-ing is a reason to B. I believe that nothing in what follows turns on the difference between this formulation and that above.
However, for brevity I will stick with the original formulation.
Third, if you are certain not to achieve the end, whether or not you take the means, we might doubt that the end provides any reason to take the means. If you have resolved not to go to California, even if you have a ticket, we may want to deny that the fact that buying a ticket could help you get to California is a reason to buy a ticket. We can account for this by stipulation: we will say that B-ing facilitates A-ing only if there is some chance that you will A, conditional on B-ing.
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Fourth, if you are certain to achieve the end, whether or not you take a certain means, we might also doubt that the end provides any reason for this means. Thus if you already have a ticket for California, the fact that buying a further ticket could also help you get to California seems to be no reason at all to buy another ticket. We can account for this by tennis, and that buying tennis balls facilitates playing tennis. The Action Pattern implies that this fact is a reason to buy tennis balls. But if selling your tennis racket facilitates buying tennis balls, then the Action Pattern also implies that this fact is a reason to sell your tennis racket. And assuming you need your tennis racket to play tennis, this seems pretty implausible. This problem deserves more attention than I can give it here -see Bedke, 'The Iffiest Oughts', n.12, Kolodny, 'Instrumental Reasons', and Millsap, 'Practical Reasons and Means-End Transmission' (PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland, in progress) for discussion. One point to note is that the problem does not arise for a version of the Action Pattern restricted to necessary facilitative steps. Much of the discussion to follow could be framed in these terms.
With the Action Pattern in hand, we can make our first claim about transmission for the right kind of reasons. Since the right kind of reasons to intend depend on reasons to act, we should expect the right kind of reasons to intend to exhibit a pattern corresponding to the Action Pattern. And that is what we find: when there are reasons of the right kind to intend to go to California, the fact that booking a ticket facilitates going to California is a reason of the right kind to intend to book a ticket, the fact that renewing your passport facilitates going to California is a reason of the right kind to intend to renew your passport, and so on. Thus, and subject to the same qualifications as the Action Pattern ought to drink the toxin, so I'll drink the toxin', thereby forming the intention to do so). In this way, believing that you ought to drink the toxin would help you to form the intention to drink the toxin, and so help you to win the $1m. That looks like a reason to believe that you ought to drink the toxin. However, it is not evidence that you ought to drink the toxin. Rather, it is a way in which it would be good to believe that you ought to drink the toxin. It is a reason of the wrong kind for this belief.
Second, suppose that you believe that going to the billionaire's mansion is necessary for drinking the toxin. If you are rational, you will find it difficult to intend to drink the toxin unless you also intend to go to the billionaire's mansion -for if you are rational, you will intend what you take to be the necessary means to your intended ends. In this way, intending to go to the billionaire's mansion would help you to intend to drink the toxin, and so win the $1m. That looks like a way in which it would be good to intend to go to the billionaire's mansion, and so a reason of the wrong kind for this intention.
In the first of these examples, the belief that you ought to drink the toxin is a means to intending to drink the toxin. In the second, the intention to go to the billionaire's mansion is an enabling condition. So what the examples suggest is that putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit across facilitative connections between attitudes -that when one attitude facilitates an attitude for which there is the wrong kind of reason, the fact that it does so is a reason of the wrong kind for that attitude. Again, this claim needs to be qualified in various ways. For example, if you have just taken an "intention pill", which will ensure that at midnight tonight you will intend to drink the toxin, then the belief that you ought to drink the toxin is superfluous. So in this version of the case, there is no benefit to, and so no reason of the wrong kind of reason for, this belief. For another example, if you are unable to sustain an intention to drink the toxin even if you intend to go to the billionaire's mansion, then forming this latter intention is pointless in a different way -in the sense of 'facilitates' stipulated earlier, it does not facilitate the intention to drink the toxin. So in this case too, there is no benefit to, and so no reason of the wrong kind for, this intention.
Keeping these qualifications in mind however -and noting in passing that they However, this argument for the Mixed Pattern fails. It may well be good for its own sake to have attitudes which constitute a proper response to one's reasons. But we do not properly respond to our reasons by having attitudes there is merely some reason for. We properly respond to our reasons only when we have attitudes there is sufficient reason for. So the appeal to value of this sort does not support the claim that it is good for its own sake to have attitudes there is reason of the right kind for. for such attitudes. We should therefore reject the Mixed Pattern, and so the General Pattern.
The Wrong Reason Pattern is a distinctive feature of the wrong kind of reasons.
WKR Skepticism and the Wrong Reason Pattern
The ways in which different kinds of reasons transmit should not, I suggest, be taken as primitive. When reasons of a certain kind have some distinctive feature, we should expect an account of reasons of that kind to explain that feature. Thus we should expect an account of the wrong kind of reasons to explain the ways in which such reasons transmit. when a reason to bring about attitude B is that doing so facilitates bringing about attitude A, the fact that attitude B facilitates attitude A will also be a reason to bring about attitude B.
The Bringing About Pattern is exactly parallel to the Wrong Reason Pattern. We can move from the former to the latter by replacing 'reason to bring about' with 'reason of the wrong kind for'. So if we take reasons to bring about an attitude to be reasons for that attitude, we will take the Wrong Reason Pattern to hold, given that the Bringing About It is a little difficult to interpret this. In particular, it is not clear whether they intend the relationship between content-reasons and correctness to be explanatory or evidential. I intend my use of 'counts in favour of' to be neutral between these interpretations. 24 Things are actually a bit more complicated than this, since Danielsson and Olson's view is that the wrong kind of reasons are a subset of holding-reasons: they are holding-reasons that do not derive from contentreasons (ibid., 517 (Reductionism) For p to be a reason of the wrong kind for attitude A is for p to be a reason of the right kind to want attitude A.
Reductionists can explain the Wrong Reason Pattern. As we saw in section three, the wrong kind of reasons transmit in the same way as the right kind of reasons for higher-order desires.
Reductionists can hold that this is so because what it is for some consideration to be a reason of the wrong kind just is for it to be a reason of the right kind for a higher-order desire.
Second Strategy: The Value-Based Theory
I now turn to a second strategy by which WKR defenders might try to explain the Wrong Reason Pattern. I shall argue that this strategy also fails, unless it is supplemented by Reductionism.
The wrong kind of reasons for an attitude seem to have something important to do with the value of that attitude. When the demon threatens to kill you unless you admire him, it would be good to admire the demon, since this would help you to stay alive. When the billionaire offers you a $1m to intend to drink the toxin, it would be good to intend to drink the toxin, because you would thereby win $1m. More generally, it seems that there is a reason of the wrong kind for an attitude just when that attitude would be valuable in some way.
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This simple observation suggests that we might give an account of the wrong kind of reasons in terms of value. We might claim that: To take an example, when there is the wrong kind of reason to intend to drink the toxin, there is a respect in which it is good to intend to drink the toxin. And so if believing that you ought to drink the toxin facilitates this intention, there is also a respect in which it is good to believe that you ought to drink the toxin -this belief facilitates the intention to drink the toxin. So by the Value-Based Theory, the fact that believing that you ought to drink the toxin facilitates intending to drink the toxin is a reason of the wrong kind to believe that you ought to drink the toxin.
The Value-Based Theory thus seems to offer a straightforward explanation of the (Reductionism) For p to be a reason of the wrong kind for attitude A is for p to be a reason of the right kind to want attitude A.
Reductionism
We have now seen that both of the WKR defender's strategies for explaining the Wrong
Reason Pattern involve a commitment to Reductionism. To see whether these strategies are successful, we must thus consider the merits of this thesis. is to be a reason for an attitude, it will become clear that Reductionism does, after all, entail that the wrong kind of reasons for an attitude are reasons for that attitude.
It is difficult, however, to see how this might work. The suggestion is that Reductionism might implicitly include an analysis of what it is to be a reason for an attitude, just as the second, deeper, analysis of what it is to be an isosceles triangle implicitly includes
an analysis of what it is to be a triangle. But there is nothing in Reductionism which looks as if it could play that role. The Reductionist's analysis involves two constituent propertiesthat of being a reason to want an attitude, and whatever further property distinguishes the right kind of reasons. But on pain of circularity, we cannot say that what it is for something to be a reason for an attitude is for it to be a reason to want that attitude. And nor can the further property serve as such an analysis. This further property is precisely intended to pick out only the right kind of reasons -it cannot be the sort of thing which will characterize all reasons for attitudes.
Third, Reductionists might suggest that we take the right kind of reasons to be prior to reasons in general, and offer a disjunctive account of the latter in terms of the former. On such an account, what it is for p to be a reason for some response is for p to be either a right kind of reason for that response or a right kind of reason to desire that response. Such an account would trivially imply that the right kind of reasons to desire an attitude are reasons for that attitude. However, while this may be the most promising of the Reductionist's options, it nonetheless faces at least two significant problems. First, since it requires us to give up the natural thought that the right kind of reasons should be given a conjunctive analysis, it is incompatible with at least some of the familiar accounts of the right kind of reasons discussed above, all of which are naturally formulated as conjunctive analyses.
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Second, the suggestion faces a general worry about disjunctive analyses. If it turns out that what it is for something to be F is for it to be either G or H, then it looks as if it has turned out that the Fs do not have anything distinctive in common -as it turned out that pieces of jade do not have anything distinctive in common. 34 It is a cost of an account if it implies that a category of things which appear to have something distinctive in common -such as reasonsturn out not to do so.
It thus seems to me that none of the three ways by which Reductionists might try to
show that the right kind of reasons to want an attitude are also reasons for that attitude is satisfactory. If this is so, WKR defenders should not accept Reductionism.
Conclusion
Both Second, there are cases in which there is no need to bring about the relevant attitude.
As Andrew Reisner observes, the incentive might be offered for a belief that you already hold, or for which you have been presented with conclusive evidence. 36 In these cases, bringing about this belief is unnecessary and so not plausibly something you have reason to do. Nonetheless, you have a reason to want this belief.
Third, there are cases in which the incentive holds on the condition that you do not bring about the relevant attitude. 37 This is the structure of Kavka's original toxin puzzle -as Kavka describes things, the billionaire will reward you only so long as you intend to drink the toxin without having hired a hypnotist, or created extra incentives for drinking the toxin, or done any of the other things which might help to bring about this intention. In cases of this sort, incentives are not reasons to bring about the relevant attitudes. Nonetheless, they are reasons to want these attitudes.
However, it might be thought that we can also describe cases in which incentives are not reasons to want the relevant attitudes. As Reisner points out, there is nothing to stop evil demons, or eccentric billionaires, offering incentives for attitudes which are conditional on your lacking the desire for that attitude. 38 For instance, the evil demon might threaten to kill you unless you admire him without also wanting to admire him. Reisner claims that in cases of this sort, incentives are not reasons to want the relevant attitude.
It is not clear that this is right. The further conditions in these cases certainly give you an incentive not to desire the relevant attitudes. But that is compatible with there also being reasons to want these attitudes. 39 So more needs to be said to defend the claim that the incentives in these cases are not reasons to want the relevant attitude.
There is more that can be said. If the incentives in these cases are reasons to want the relevant attitudes, they are reasons of a rather strange sort. For notice that if you form the desire to admire the demon in response to the demon's threat, then the incentive for admiring the demon disappears -the demon will kill you anyway. So if the incentive for admiring the demon is a reason to want to admire the demon, it is a reason which cannot survive being responded to.
It is a matter of dispute whether there can be reasons of this sort. Many philosophers accept an "internalist" condition on reasons, according to which a consideration is a reason to A only if it is possible to A for that reason. This condition rules out reasons of the above sort. A third version of the objection is more promising. Reisner suggests that WKR defenders can offer a straightforward explanation of the reasons to bring about attitudes for which there is an incentive, which is not available to WKR skeptics. 42 The explanation appeals to the transmission of reasons across facilitative connections. Reisner's thought is that WKR defenders can say that there is reason to bring about such an attitude because bringing about such an attitude is a means to having an attitude which there is reason for.
However, this explanation requires there to be reasons for such attitudes, and so is not available to WKR skeptics. 43 Reisner is right that WKR skeptics cannot explain reasons to bring about these attitudes in this way. But an equally plausible explanation is available to them. For as a first pass, it is highly plausible that there is reason to bring about states that there is reason to want. Something along these lines is needed to explain, for instance, why there can be reasons to bring about headaches and perceptual experiences, among other things there can be reason to want, but which are not themselves subject to reasons. And this principle can equally explain why there are reasons to bring about attitudes for which there are 42 Reisner, 'The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons', 269-70. 43 There is room to challenge the transmission pattern which Reisner relies on here. Reisner's pattern requires there to be reasons to do things that facilitate attitudes there is reason to have. I think the arguments against the Mixed Pattern in section two also count against this pattern. Nonetheless, I will grant Reisner's pattern for present purposes.
incentives. 44 So this version of the objection also fails to show that the WKR skeptic's negative claim undermines the positive claim.
There is a final objection to WKR skepticism to consider. 
